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CROSS-DRESSERS WITH BENEFITS: FEMALE COMBAT 
SOLDIERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL 
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles·j• 
The entry of women into posItions of power in the military in 
general, and into combat units more specifically, is the ultimate 
manifestation of women's forging into the traditional male realm. 
The military warrior is perhaps the ultimate personification of the 
male gender role. I Accordingly, there is significant resistance to 
women in combat roles. 2 
While some of this resistance has to do with actual physical 
differences between the sexes,3 such physical differences can be 
overcome by some women.4 Physical differences-upper body 
strength, stamina, physical might-that may be necessary for combat 
are not relevant to those women who can meet minimum 
requirements for duty. To the extent women can overcome minimum 
physical thresholds set forth for combat roles, excuses for excluding 
women based on physical differences are stereotypical and should be 
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1. See, e.g., Judith Gardam. Gender and Non-Combatant immunity. 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 345, 366-67 (1993). 
2. See generally Michelle Beneke & Kirsten Dodge, Military Women in Nontraditional 
Job Fields: Casualties of the Armed Forces' War on Homosexuals. 13 HARV. 
WOMEN'S L.J. 215,216,232 (1990) (discussing informal barriers facing women in 
combat roles in the context of "institutionalized sexual harassment of military women 
through 'lesbian baiting'''); Paul E. Roush, The Exclusionists and Their Message, 39 
NAVAL L. REv. 163, 163 (1990) (discussing those who oppose women being assigned 
to combat units). 
3. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON. SEX EQUALITY 273 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing 
arguments in favor of exempting women from registering for the draft). 
4. See Kenneth L. Karst. The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed 
Forces, 38 UCLA L. REv. 499, 532 n.132 (1991). It should be noted that no reasons 
are documented to underlie the combat exclusion in U.S. law. See MAcKINNON, 
supra note 3, at 275. 
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rejected. The Department of Defense has therefore abandoned the 
argument that physical might is what requires female exclusion from 
combat.s Some even argue that physical might is actually not what is 
needed for combat roles, and thus, that exclusion is completely based 
on sex discrimination.6 A greater challenge is determining whether 
combat roles should adapt to meet the average woman's physical 
capacities. However, with the evolution of modern combat, the 
blurring of front lines with support services,7 and a greater emphasis 
on enabling technologies rather than brute strength, the problem is 
essentially solving itself.8 
Most of the resistance to women engaging in combat roles is not 
based on beliefs about physical differences. Rather, it is based on 
normative gender-role beliefs that women, by their nature, are 
inappropriate for combat and will inhibit the effectiveness of the 
"male warrior," or concerns about sexuality and sexual mores 
affecting "cohesion."9 These concerns are hard to quantify, are 
highly speculative, and have been largely discredited. 1o Moreover, 
these concerns are based on others' negative reactions to women in 
the military, and thus, it seems unfair to punish qualified women who 
want to serve on that account. ll Mainly, these concerns stem from 
ideas about women's frailty, their perceived need for protection, and 
a perception of women as sexual objects, as opposed to equal 
members of society; as such, they should be rejected. 12 While some 
5. See Karst, supra note 4, at 532. 
6. See Blythe Leszkay, Feminism on the Front Lines, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LT. 133, 
158-63 (2003). 
7. See, e.g., Diane H. Mazur, Military Values in Law, 14 DUKE 1. GENDER L. & POL'y 
977, 988 (2007) ('The core definition of direct ground combat was itself in question 
because the battlefield had ceased to be linear. There was no longer a place that was 
predictably 'well forward on the battletield,' a central component of the Direct 
Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule." (footnote omitted)). 
8. See Michael 1. Frevola, Damn the Torpedoes, Full Speed Ahead: The Argument for 
Total Sex Integration in the Armed Forces, 28 CONN. L. REv. 621, 637 (1996); Karst, 
supra note 4, at 532. 
9. See Leszkay, supra note 6, at 160. 
10. See Alison Harding, Report: Women Should be Allowed to Serve in Combat, 
CNN.COM (January 15, 2011, 6:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011IPOLITICS/ 
01l15/military.women/index.html?hpt=T2; Leszkay, supra note 6, at 160. 
11. See Leszkay, supra note 6, at 160. 
12. See Mary Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of Rights: A 
Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 496 (1992); Wendy Williams, The 
Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. 
L. REP. 175, 189-90 ( 1982) (excluding women from the draft paints women as 
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cite concerns regarding the rape and torture of women, excluding 
women from combat arguably makes them more vulnerable than 
women who receive military training and experience the equal and 
empowered status combat training provides. 13 Moreover, modem 
warfare has "blurred the existence of a 'front and a rear' ," enabling 
the capture of women even when not in direct combat roles. 14 Of 
course, men are also vulnerable to rape and torture. The male need to 
conform to a code of chivalry, protect women, and sustain their own 
egos has no place in the process of trying to recruit the best and 
brightest to defend a country. 
However, the current reality is that many military positions, and 
combat roles in particular, remain bastions of women's exclusion in a 
world in which excluding women from male institutions and 
traditional professions has fallen away to constitutional objections 
and broad societal changes. IS Women are increasingly involved in 
the military but are still subject to explicit exclusions. In the United 
States in particular, women are not required to register for selective 
service under the draft lawl6 and are prohibited from engaging in 
direct combat roles. 17 Most countries worldwide have similar 
restrictions and regulations. 18 
From an international perspective, Israel presents an iconic view 
of women soldiers and the progressive inclusion of women in the 
victims who need protection and undermines notions of shared responsibility in 
society). 
13. See Leszkay, supra note 6, at 164-65. 
14. Jd.atI66. 
IS. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. SIS (1996) (declaring unconstitutional 
Virginia Military Institute's provision of a single sex, all male educational 
environment); l.E.B. v. Alabama ex reI. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (prohibiting 
peremptory challenges to jurors solely on the basis of gender); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 
101 F.3d ISS, 184-85 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[Brown must implement a] full and effective 
accommodation of the athletics interests and abilities of its women students."). 
16. 50 U.S.c. app. § 453(a) (2006). 
17. See DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT TO THE WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON WOMEN AND GIRLS 4, 6 
(2009), available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/DoD_WHC_on _ Women_and 
_Girls_Report ~ersonal_ info Jedacted _ C82A. pdf. 
18. Fitriani & Ron Matthews, Women at War: Possible Lessons for Small States-
Analysis, EURASIA REV. (Oct. 7, 2007), http://www.eurasiareview.com/07102011-
women-at-war-possible-lessons-for-small-states-analysis. See generally Rostker v. 
United States, 453 U.S. 57, 78-79 (1981); Case C-186/0I, Dory v. Federal Republic 
of Germany, [2003] E.C.R. 1-2508 (decided Mar. 11,2003); Beate Rudolf, European 
Union: Compulsory Military Service, 3 INT'L 1. CONST. L. 673 (2003) (discussing a 
decision by the European Court of Human Rights refusing to interfere in the decisions 
of member states to exclude women from the military). 
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military.19 Images abound of the young female soldier dressed in her 
olive green uniform and wielding an Uzi that is half her size.20 She is 
a soldier just like her male peers-she is strong and powerful. This 
image has developed for two main reasons. First, Israel, unlike its 
peers in terms of economic development and democratic governance, 
has a mandatory draft.21 Second, that draft pertains to all men and 
women who are not otherwise exempted because of religious study, 
religious practice, or a serious conscientious objection that impairs 
their ability to serve.22 
In a recent New York Times article, a woman from the U.S. 
military spoke wistfully of the equality and opportunity enjoyed by 
her peers in Israel, where women are permitted to take on all the 
military roles available to men.23 She commented, "They make up a 
third of the [ military], and are treated as equals with males. ,,24 
Apparently, however, her source for this information was a video 
created by CNN featuring footage of Israeli female soldiers.25 
Indeed, the image of Israel as being at the forefront of 
empowering women through military service, as personified in its 
female soldiers, is misleading.26 Although legally permitted to 
engage in even direct combat roles, Israeli women very rarely engage 
in combat support roles, are completely absent as infantry, and have 
advanced insignificantly in military leadership.27 Particularly in the 
19. Daphne Barak-Erez, The Feminist Battle for Citizenship: Between Combat Duties and 
Conscientious Objection, 13 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 531, 533 (2007). 
20. Inputting the search string "female uzi soldier" into Google's image search engine on 
October 7, 2011 yielded over 40,000 results, many of the images portraying Israeli 
soldiers. 
21. See Amir Paz Fuchs & Michael Sfard, The Fallacies of Objections to Selective 
Conscientious Objections, 361sR. L. REv. III, 114 n.7 (2004). 
22. See Defense Service Law, 5746-1986, 40 LSI 112, §§ 30, 36 (amended in 2000) 
(Tsr.); see also infra notes 160-82 and accompanying text (explaining the extent of 
exemptions for conscientious objections for men and women). 
23. Catherine Ross, Home Fires: Women's Work, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 15,2010,9:00 PM), 
http://opinionator. blogs.nytimes.com/20 I 01021 15/womens-work. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. See Noya Rimalt, Women in the Sphere of Masculinity: The Double-Edged Sword of 
Women's Integration in the Military, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'y 1097, 1113-15 
(2007) (describing the cultural restraints that maintain segregation in the army despite 
women's freedom to engage in all combat roles); Nitza Berkowitz, 'Women of Valor': 
Women and Citizenship in Israel [Hebrew] 2 ISRAELI Soc. 277, 309 (1999). 
27. See, e.g., Barak-Erez, supra note 19, at 531-33, 536-40; Datha Izraeli, Gendering 
Military Service in the Israel Defense Forces, 12 ISR. Soc. SCI. RES. 129, 131 (1997) 
(,,[T]he gender regime of the Israeli army, which is based on a gendered division of 
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military context, Israel's dedication to formal equality and its 
occasional indication of its commitment to substantive equality and 
affirmative action for women28 is peppered with 100pholes.29 In fact, 
as I will argue in this paper, the more parochial United States-with 
its sexually discriminatory regulations that exclude women from the 
draft and from direct combat units30-is actually more advanced in 
the quest for gender equality in the military. 
The comparison I present between the roles of women in the 
Israeli military and the U.S. military will demonstrate how feminism 
has taken hold differently in different cultures, with contrasting 
results. In Israel, facial attempts to achieve gender-neutrality provide 
little relief in the face of a legal and cultural background in which 
gender inequalities are still deeply ingrained and gender differences, 
including the role of mothering, have not been sufficiently unpacked 
labor and a gendered structure of power, both formal and informal, constitutes and 
sustains the proverbial, taken-for-granted role of women in society as help-meet to 
men." (citation omitted)); Joyce Robbins and Uri Ben-Eliezer, New Roles or New 
Times? Gender Inequality and Militarism in Israel's Nation-in-Arms, 7 (3) Soc. POL. 
309,333-37 (2000). 
28. See, e.g., Women's Equal Rights Law, 5711-1951, 5 LSI 171 (amended in 2000) 
(Isr.); HCJ 453/94 Israel Women's Network v. Gov't of Israel, 48(5) PD 501 [1994] 
(Isr.) [hereinafter Israel Women's Network] (setting forth a policy of affirmative 
action in public office); HCJ 104/87 Nevo v. Nat'! Labour Court 44(4) PD 749 [1990] 
(Isr.) [hereinafter Nevo] (indicating a commitment to the principle of formal equality 
between the sexes). For an English translation of Nevo, see http://elyonl. 
court.gov.il/files _ eng/87 1040100 IIZ0 118700 1040.z0 l.pdf. All other citations to this 
case refer to the English translation. For an English translation of Israel Women's 
Network, see http://elyon1.court.gov . i Uti les _ eng/941 53 01004/Z0 1194004530 .zO 1 . pdf. 
All other citations to this case refer to the English translation. Family law is largely 
governed by the more gender focused Jewish Law. See RUTH HALPERIN-KADDARI, 
WOMEN IN ISRAEL: A STATE OF THEIR OWN 227 (2004); Daphne Barak-Erez, 
Commentary, Can Equality Survive Exceptions?, 107 MICH. L. REv. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 134, 135 (2009), available at http://www.michiganlawreview.org/ 
firstimpressions/vol107/barak-erez.pdf; Frances Raday, Equality of Women Under 
Israeli Law, JERUSALEM Q. 27, 81, 81-82 (1983); Frances Raday, The Israeli 
Perspective on Gender, Labour and the Family, in THE STATUS OF WOMEN AT THE 
DAWN OF THE TWENTy-FIRST CENTURY 113,117-19,126(2001). 
29. Even cases such as Nevo v. Minister of Labor, which raised the mandatory retirement 
age for women to equal that for men and is the standard bearer of formal equality in 
Israel, see Barak-Erez, supra note 19, at 137, permit women to retire at a younger age 
if they so choose but does not allow men the same advantage. Nevo, supra note 28, at 
10. 
30. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 453(a) (2006) (excluding women from the draft); DEP'T OF DEF., 
supra note 17, at 3 (noting the U.S. policy of excluding women from direct combat 
units). 
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and analyzed.3l Indeed, it is the significant sex-based benefits 
provided to mothers and women in the Israeli military (e.g., 
exemption from reserve duty and a shortened draft) that help to 
preserve women's inequality despite facially neutral laws.32 By 
contrast, in the United States, where the military has carved out a 
special island of differentiation, underlying advances in the treatment 
of women, the alleviation of workplace inequalities and changes in 
the very nature of warfare have made women more equal in the 
military than draft registration or combat laws make apparent. 33 
Achieving equality is more complex than simply being granted 
permission to engage in traditionally male roles like combat warfare. 
Cultural and legal contexts are crucial to understanding the nature of 
inequality and the best road to reform. Demanding neutrality or 
special treatment without carefully analyzing the values and practical 
ramifications at stake may undermine the enterprise. The United 
States should take heed of how benefits given to Israeli women in 
combat roles have undermined their success in the military and 
recognize that gender neutrality in job assignment cannot by itself 
ensure women's empowerment and equality. The Israeli legal system 
should reflect on how underlying legal and cultural forces can make 
facially neutral laws ineffective. 
This article will proceed in four parts. In the first part, I will 
unpack the seminal court cases from the United States and Israel 
regarding the role of women in the military in their respective 
countries-Rostker v. United States and Miller v. Israel Defense 
Forces. 34 I will point to the differences and similarities in the two 
cases and demonstrate how each case contends with legally created 
benefits to women, which, in tum, create real differences between the 
sexes. In the second part, I will identify problems with the Israeli 
system of giving legal benefits to women in the military and propose 
how to rid Israeli legislation of discrimination and stereotypes by 
adopting provisions that support reproduction in a manner that 
recognizes the role of both mothers and fathers in raising children. In 
31. See infra text accompanying notes 143-56. 
32. See infra text accompanying notes 55-61. 
33. See infra text accompanying notes 137-42 (discussing how women in the U.S. 
military are actually held to a more equal standard than the draft and combat laws 
would suggest). 
34. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); He] 4541194 Miller v. Minister of Defense, 
49(4) PD 94 [1995] (Isr.) [hereinafter Miller]. For an English translation of the latter, 
see http://elyon1.court.gov.illfiles_eng/94/41O/045/Z01l9404541O.z01.pdf All other 
citations to this case refer to the English translation. 
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the third part, I will describe further how deep cultural norms and 
religious influences create discrimination despite gender-neutrality. 
And in the fourth part, I will draw conclusions from the comparison 
of the roles of women in the Israeli and U.S. militaries and argue that 
there is more to gender equality than whether laws are gender-neutral 
or benefits for women exist. Indeed, gender-neutrality can provide a 
problematic mask under which deep discrimination lingers. As such, 
the underlying reasons for benefits and the context in which 
neutrality functions must be critically analyzed. In the United States, 
progress toward gender equality makes discrimination in military 
laws less harmful, while gender-neutral laws in Israel fail to dissolve 
deep discriminatory policies. 
I. THE FLIPSIDE OF LEGAL BENEFITS 
Any discussion of women in the military in Israel must consider 
the seminal case of Miller v. Israel Defense Forces. 35 Miller 
demonstrates that women are still second-class citizens in the Israeli 
army. Unlike in the United States, Israeli laws and regulations do not 
prohibit women from direct combat units or exclude them from the 
draft. 36 Yet the laws provide significant benefits to women-benefits 
that keep them subordinate and handicapped. 37 
From a theoretical perspective, many liberal feminists are inclined 
to look at any benefits as problematic both as a matter of 
constitutional law and because they undermine the effort to obtain 
formal equality.38 Here, however, I take a more nuanced view, 
arguing that some benefits that are sex-specific (recognizing 
biological differences regarding gestation, for instance) or gender 
sensitive are not only acceptable but are necessary for achieving 
equality because of the existence of legitimate and valuable gender 
differences.39 Indeed, not recognizing such differences discriminates 
35. Miller, supra note 34. 
36. Defense Service Law, 5746-1986, 40 LSI 112, §§ 1, 16A, (amended in 2000) (Isr.). 
37. See generally Barak-Erez, supra note 19, passim (discussing how ingrained 
exceptionalism has undermined notions of equality in Israel). 
38. See, e.g., Linda 1. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal 
Treatment, Positive Action, and the Meaning of Woman's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE 
U. L. REV. 513, 533-39 (1983); Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy 
and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 325, 345-46 (1984). See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, 
Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought of the 1970's, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
9, 10-19 (discussing leading Supreme Court cases). 
39. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
215-36 (1989); Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault 
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against women by not acknowledging the legitimacy of such 
differences. 4o Other benefits, like the ones given to women in the 
Israeli military, are deeply problematic. The effort must be made to 
distinguish between the "good" benefits and the "bad" ones in order 
to achieve real substantive equality for women. After explaining the 
facts and legal holding of Miller, I will explain how I believe such a 
distinction between good and bad benefits can and must be made in 
the context of women in the military. 
In Miller, the facts were ideal to challenge the military status quo. 
At the time, no woman had ever been assigned to become a pilot in 
the Israeli Air Force.41 In Miller, a female candidate for the Israel Air 
Force pilot's course was already a civilian pilot, and she was 
qualified in every way for service in the Israeli Air Force. 42 Yet the 
army refused to assign Miller to an Israeli-Air-Force profession 
because she was a woman.43 They informed her that it was the policy 
of the military not to assign women to combat roles, such as piloting 
aircrafts, regardless of their qualifications. 44 Her lawyers, aware of 
the great pull embodied in the justification of national security and 
the difficulty in legally challenging older laws in Israel, such as the 
Defense Service Law,45 were particularly cautious. They did not 
attack any fundamental legislation or broad policies; they asked only 
that Alice Miller be permitted to serve in the Israeli Air Force as a 
pilot.46 
Moreover, the legal background could not have been riper for such 
an attack. The authority supporting military directives establishing a 
list of certain female jobs and requiring that women not be placed in 
combat professions without separate consent and approval had 
recently been repealed.47 Accordingly, although sex-specific 
classifications were still on the books, the Defense Minister's 
Divorce and its Aftermath, 56 U. ON. L. REV. 1, 77-89 (1987) (differences in 
relationships with offspring); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender 
Difference in the Law: Revaluing the Caretaker Role, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 36-
45 (2008); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 
1279, 1295-1300, 1304-08, 1323-33 (1987). 
40. See sources cited supra note 39. 
41. Miller, supra note 34, at 6 (opinion of Mazza, .T.). 
42. Id. at 5. 
43. Id. at 6. 
44. Id. 
45. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. 
46. Miller, supra note 34, at 9 (opinion of Mazza, .T.). 
47. Jd. at 7-8. 
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authority for promulgating the directives was no longer valid. 48 Thus, 
aviation, considered a combat role, was not foreclosed to Ms. Miller 
as a matter of military law, but only as a matter of military policy.49 
At first glance, the army's decision seems to be a clear-cut case of 
discrimination on the basis of sex. 50 Still, what is so challenging 
about this decision is how compelling the military's case was for 
denying Miller the chance to be a pilot. While military regulations 
were no longer authorized to dictate that certain military professions 
belonged to women only, there are three legal distinctions between 
men and women in the military that are codified and solidified in the 
Defense Service Law. 51 First, women have a mandatory service of 
two years, while men serve for three years in compulsory service. 52 
Second, women serve in compulsory reserves only until the age of 
thirty-eight while men serve until the age of fifty-four. 53 Third, and 
most significantly, women are exempted from compulsory military 
service if they are married, and excluded from reserve duty altogether 
if they are pregnant or are mothers. 54 
The military therefore argued that because of these significant 
exemptions or "benefits" given to women, it was financially and 
logistically unjustifiable to train a woman to be a pilot in the Israeli 
Air Force.55 Such service required a voluntary extension of service 
48. See id. 
49. See id. 
50. Women's Equal Rights Law, 5711-1951, 5 LSI 171 (amended in 2000) (Isr.). 
Although Israel has the Women's Equal Rights Law, which explicitly disallows any 
form of discrimination against women, the law has only limited force. The law is not 
one of the entrenched laws and can thus be overridden by religious law or prior 
legislation. See id. § 5; Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, 1391 LSI 
150, § 10 (1992) (Isr.), available at http://www.knesset.gov.illlaws/special/ 
eng/basic3 _ eng.htm. Moreover, it permits different treatment between men and 
women when there are relevant and substantive distinctions between them. But in 
numerous cases, such as Dr. Naomi Neva v. National Labor Court, Israeli courts have 
embraced formal equality. See Nevo, supra note 28, at 1-3. Israeli courts have also 
determined that affirmative action for women in public offices is required. Israel 
Women's Network, supra note 28, at 10,12-13. 
51. Defense Service Law, 5746-1986, 40 LSI 112, §§ I, 15, 16,29,39 (amended in 2000) 
(Isr.). 
52. Jd. §§ IS, 16. 
53. Jd. §§ 1,29. 
54. Jd. § 39. 
55. Miller, supra note 34, at 12; cf Barak-Erez, supra note 19, at 536 (2007) (describing 
the potentially pernicious nature of benefits to women: "In principle, the bill [Defense 
Services Law] supported women's enlistment, but it also made highly significant 
distinctions between the service envisioned for women and for men."). 
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for women of seven years at the time of the Miller case, currently 
nine years,56 and particularly frequent and extensive reserve duty. 57 
Training women, it is argued, even those who agree to volunteer for 
the extended time it takes to undergo Israeli-Air-Force training, does 
not make sense for the military. 58 Under the law, women pilots can 
exempt themselves from extended service and reserves by getting 
married or having children. 59 Any attempts to voluntarily exempt 
oneself from such benefits are considered unlikely to be 
enforceable.60 Thus, it is no surprise that the military did not want to 
train women pilots and that women, despite gender-neutral 
regulations, were, and still are, largely absent from combat roles and 
the higher echelons of the Israeli military.61 Although these legal 
distinctions are intended to benefit Israeli women, these benefits 
make it harder for women to achieve stature and desirable placement 
in the highest ranks of the army. 
Two justices agreed with the military's argument summarized 
above with an added dose of deference to military decision-making in 
light of national security concerns. 62 The other three justices did 
not,63 and the military was compelled to accept Alice Miller into a 
pilots training course, which, unfortunately, she did not complete.64 
Since then, however, women have succeeded in becoming Israeli 
combat pilots.65 
56. Miller, supra note 34, at 39 (opinion of Tal J.) (noting that women pilots have two 
years compulsory service and an additional five years of voluntary service to which 
they must commit). The modern requirement for soldiers is a nine year commitment 
in total compulsory and voluntary service. See http://iaf.org.i1l2464-he/IAF.aspx 
(pointing out that obligatory service is now nine years for pilots) (Hebrew translated 
by author). 
57. See Netanel Lorch, The Israel Defense Forces, ISR. MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFAIRS (May 
31, 1997), http://www.mfa.gov.iIlMF AlFacts%20About%20lsraeIlState/The%20lsrael 
%20Defense%20Forces; Yehontan Maroz, The Girls, ISRAELI AIR FORCE (Feb. I, 
2011), http://www.iaforg.i1!4365-36046-en/IAF.aspx. 
58. Miller, supra note 34, at 12-13 (opinion of Mazza, J.). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. See Barak-Erez, supra note 19, at 536,538,544,553, 555, 557. 
62. Miller, supra note 34, at 24-25 (opinion of Kedmi, .T.); id. at 38-39 (opinion of Tal, 
l). 
63. See id. at 23-24 (opinion of Mazza, J.); id. at 33-34 (opinion of Strasberg-Cohen, .T.); 
id. at 60 (opinion of Dorner, J .). 
64. Israel Air Force Notfor Her, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1996, at A9 (explaining that Alice 
Miller failed qualification exams for flight training). 
65. RUTH HALPERIN-KADDARI, WOMEN IN ISRAEL: A STATE OF THEIR OWN 157-58 
(2004); Yossi Yehushua, JDF Presents: 3 New Female Pilots, YNETNEWS (Dec. 22, 
2005, 9:02 AM), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/O.7340.L-3188543.OO.html; Two 
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The challenge for the other three justices was to justify a legal 
demand that the army work around and bear the costs of these 
potentially enormous benefits (or constraints) bestowed upon 
women.66 The law itself was not challenged, and the justices did not 
argue that the Defense Service Law itself, which provides these 
significant benefits, be changed. 67 Rather, it was the military policy 
of excluding women from the Israeli Air Force that was under fire. 68 
Military forces have traditionally enjoyed exceptional deference due 
to national security concems.69 How, then, can a court demand that 
the army deal with this potentially significant constraint in training its 
troops? Is this not a matter of national security-of life and death? 
Particularly in Israel, where there is so much financial, political, and 
societal support of the need for military might, how could the court 
demand such a sacrifice from the military?7o In other words, in 
Miller there was a significant, legally created difference between men 
and women in military contexts-as undeniable, albeit less useful, as 
Female Pilots and a Female Navigator Set to Graduate from Recent Pilot Course, 
ISR. DEF. FORCES (Dec. 29, 2010, 14:42), http://dover.idf.il/lDF/English/News/ 
todayl1 011212901. 
66. See Miller, supra note 34, at 23-24 (opinion of Mazza, J.). 
67. Judicial review of infringing legislation was expressly restricted to legislation enacted 
after 1992. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, 1391 LSI 150 (1992) 
(Tsr.), available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm. 
68. Miller, supra note 34, at 8 (opinion of Mazza, J.). 
69. See, e.g., Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) ("We 'give 
great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the 
relative importance of a particular military interest.'" (quoting Goldman v. 
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986))); Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 
530 (1988) ("[U]nless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts 
traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in 
military and national security affairs."); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 
(1981) ("[P]erhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference 
[than in national defense and military affairs]."); Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494 (1951); 
Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Miller, supra note 34, at 23 (opinion of 
Mazza, 1); Devin Schindler, Between Safety and Transparency: Prior Restraints, 
FOIA, and the Power of the Executive, 38 HASTINGS CaNST. L. Q. 1,41 (2010). 
70. Although there is still some deference to the military in court decisions, commentators 
have noted that the deference is decreasing. Guy Davidov & Amnon Reichman, 
Prolonged Armed Conflict & Diminished Deference to the Military: Lessons from 
Israel, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 919, 922 (201 0) ("Much like courts in other countries, 
the Israeli Supreme Court generally exhibits some degree of deference to the forward-
looking decisions of governmental agencies."); Jason Litwack, Note, A 
Disproportionate Ruling for all the Right Reasons: Beit Sourik Village v. The Gov't 
of Israel, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 857, 895-96 (2006); Stephen J. Schulhefer, Checks 
and Balances in Torture: American, British & Israel Experiences, 102 MICH. L. REv. 
1906, 1910, 1923 (2004). 
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biological differences such as gestational capacItIes and 
breastfeeding.71 Although the difference in this case was created by 
the law and not by nature, it existed nonetheless, and the question 
was how to deal with it. 
In the United States, the same general issue arose in Rostker v. 
United States. 72 At issue in Rostker was whether a law mandating 
draft registration for men and not women was permissible under the 
Equal Protection Clause.73 The majority noted that such a sex-based 
classification was justified because of a prior legal differentiation 
between men and women-only men can serve in combat units. 74 
This legally created distinction, which the Court felt reflected 
Congress's support of allegedly well-established and entrenched 
societal norms, provided a sufficient state interest to justify excluding 
women from registering for the draft. 75 The underlying law that 
excluded women from combat roles was not even challenged. 76 The 
dissent acutely pointed to the many non-combat jobs (70-80% of all 
jobs in the military)77 that might be filled by drafted women, and 
called the majority decision discriminatory. 78 But the weight of the 
difference created by the laws determining who can perform combat 
roles overrode that reasoning for the majority when it came to 
registration for the draft. 79 
In Israel, however, Justices Mazza, Strasberg-Cohen, and Domer 
were intent on overcoming the weight of the law that created legal 
distinctions between men and women in the military. 80 Strasberg-
71. See Miller, supra note 34, at 26 (opinion of Strasberg-Cohen, J.) ("The law does not 
contain any provision directly violating the equality of men and women soldiers with 
respect to the nature of the jobs to which they can be assigned, but as a result of the 
distinction that the law created in the service conditions, there arose-as a matter of 
policy - an inequality which, for our purposes, is the refusal to accept women for an 
aviation course. Tn my opinion, the distinction created by the law should not be 
perpetuated by discrimination built on its foundations."). 
72. 453 U.S. 57. 
73. Id. at 59. 
74. Id. at 77-79. 
75. Id. at 76-79. 
76. Id. at 67. 
77. See William A. Kamens, Selective Disservice: The Indefensible Discrimination of 
Draft Registration, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 703, 719 n.118, 720 n.129, 736 n.255, 759 
n.433 (2003). 
78. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 84-86 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 100 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
79. See id. at 83 (majority opinion). 
80. Miller, supra note 34, at 14 (opinion of Mazza, .T.); id. at 29 (opinion of Strasberg-
Cohen, J.); id. at 59-61 (opinion of Dorner, J.). 
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Cohen explicitly recognized the legally created difference between 
men and women: 
In my opinion, the difference between the service conditions 
of men and the service conditions of women, as stipulated in 
the law, creates a real and difficult problem for the training 
and service of women as pilots. The continuity of a woman 
pilot's military service may be affected and her military 
service is liable to end if she marries, becomes pregnant or 
becomes a mother, and she can be released from reserve 
duty at the age of 38 ... by giving unilateral notice, even if 
she volunteers for such service above that age. 81 
Justice Strasberg-Cohen analogized the "benefit" of reduced 
military service for women to a physical disability and argued that it 
should be accommodated: 
If, for example, a disabled person in a wheelchair wants to 
be accepted for work in a public institution, and his 
qualifications fulfil the requirements of the job, but the 
access to the office is by way of stairs; the restriction in the 
physical conditions allowing access to the place of work 
creates a relevant difference .... Therefore we would 
require an investment of resources in order to neutralize the 
difference and remedy it by means of an elevator or in some 
other way that will allow the disabled person to reach that 
office. 82 
Like a physical disability, she argued, the legally created 
disability, mistakenly called a benefit, for women in the army should 
be accommodated to counter the burdens it puts on women in 
achieving equality and desirable placements in the army.83 
Such an analogy to a physical disability is reminiscent of attempts 
to contend with pregnancy discrimination in U.S. law. 84 Pregnancy is 
the quintessential sex difference. 85 Even otherwise liberal feminists, 
who focus on equal treatment and ignore differences whenever 
possible, accept the need to contend with the different biological state 
81. Jd. at 27 (opinion ofStrasberg-Cohen, 1). 
82. Id. at 29. 
83. See id. at 31. 
84. See Williams, supra note 38, at 325. 
85. See id. at 325-26. 
334 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 41 
of pregnancy. 86 In Geduldig v. Aiello, the Supreme Court held that, 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is not sex-based 
discrimination, and thus, the state only had to provide a rational 
reason for its exclusion of pregnant women from an employee 
disability plan. 87 In reaction to this dubious holding, the Federal 
Government passed an amendment to Title VII, which prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sex, to include discrimination on the 
basis of pregnancy as sex discrimination. 88 According to Title VII, as 
amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), employers 
must treat pregnancy like any other disability-it must receive the 
same legal treatment as physical or mental disabilities. 89 Struggling 
with how to categorize a female sex difference in gender-neutral 
terms, the law treats it as equivalent to a disability that must be 
accommodated. 
Equating pregnancy to a disability has received some support.90 
But others have argued that pregnancy is a natural condition, not a 
disability, and should not be analogized as such. 91 This dispute came 
to a head in California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. 
Guerra, when California tried to treat maternity leave more favorably 
than other disability leave.92 The Supreme Court held that pregnancy 
86. See Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce 
and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. I, 17 (1987) (discussing her theory of episodic 
difference in which she accepts the need to accept sexual differences only during the 
stage of pregnancy). 
87. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1974). 
88. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,42 U.S.c. § 2000e(k) (2006). 
89. Id. 
90. See, e.g., Brief of the ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 7, 
Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (No. 85-494),1986 WL 
728369; Williams, supra note 38, at 357. 
91. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 41 (2d ed. 2003); 
Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Badfor Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination 
Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1,47-49 (2010); see William R. 
Corbett, The Ugly Truth About Appearance Discrimination and the Beauty of Our 
Employment Discrimination Law, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'y, 153-54 (2007) 
(classifying pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex discrimination, not 
discrimination based on a disability); Krieger & Cooney, supra note 38, at 539-45 
(arguing that pregnancy is an inherent sex difference, not a normative one); Littleton, 
supra note 39, at 1299 (supporting the notion that pregnancy should be treated "as 
'different' from other causes of disability"). 
92. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 275-76 (noting that under California law, women who took 
maternity leave were guaranteed a similar position upon their return, while those on 
disability leave were not). 
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did not have to be treated like any other disability, as it would seem 
from the face of PDA, but that Title VII should be viewed as a floor 
and that extra benefits could be provided.93 
Treating gender differences as disabilities is troubling because 
they are not. As MacKinnon aptly notes, women are as different 
from men as men are from women.94 From a male perspective, a 
woman's difference might look like a disability. But is that the way 
we want to frame legal rights and responsibilities; characterizing 
female differences as disabilities? Why should the male norm be the 
model against which disabilities are defined? Categorizing women's 
differences as disabilities fails to appreciate the reality of women's 
lives. Women are not disabled when they are pregnant; they are 
reproducing and thereby providing a valuable service to society.95 
When women's differences provide significant value to society, those 
differences should be supported, not just accommodated as a physical 
disability.96 A legal system that treats women's differences as 
disabilities is clearly male-centered and will always undervalue those 
differences as aberrations. There is a need for substantive equality to 
affirmatively accommodate women's biological differences without 
attempting to treat such differences in gender-neutral but male-
centered terms.97 
93. Id. at 285. 
94. CATHARINE MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES IN LIFE AND LAW 32, 37 (1987). 
95. See e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way out of the 
Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118, 1175 (1986) 
("Employers should bear the costs of [childbearing] responsibilities because 
childbearing and rearing are crucially important social functions that are connected to 
and have major impacts on the work world."); Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: 
Employment Discrimination Law, Women's Cultural Caregiving and the Limits of 
Economic and Liberal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371, 452-53, 467-68 (2001). 
But see Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law and 
Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 186-87, 208 (2001) (arguing that children are 
not, in fact, a public good, but rather a personal choice and that population can be 
replenished by immigration). For a poignant critique of Franke's argument, see 
Becker, infra notes 96-97. 
96. See Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 57,61 (2002) ("'We 
need to elevate care to this level of importance [a core value] for the basic reason that 
it is essential to human health and balanced development."') (quoting MONA 
HARRINGTON, CARE AND EQUALITY: INVENTING A NEW FAMILY POLITICS 48-49 
(1999)); Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony and the Rehabilitation of Family 
Care, 71 N.C. L. REv. 721, 787-802 (1993); Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 39, at 36-40. 
97. CAROL GILLIGAN. IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S 
DEVELOPMENT (1993); Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a 
Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 41-42; Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 
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In the cases of Miller and Rostker, women's situations should not 
be viewed as disabilities. Rather, the women received legislative 
exclusions or benefits that differentiated them from men and were 
then discriminated against because of those benefits. Describing 
women as having a disability pretends that their disadvantages are 
accidents of fate, like being born without a leg, not a state imposed 
problem that can be remedied. 
In Miller, on the other hand, Justice Dorner swung more broadly, 
arguing that sex-based discrimination affronts human dignity, which, 
she argued, is protected by the Israeli Basic Law of Human Dignity. 98 
Anchoring prohibitions against sex-discrimination in human dignity 
instead of equality has the possible consequence that laws could be 
unequal on their face yet not be discriminatory because they do not 
violate human dignity.99 Or stated differently, it is substantive 
equality and not formal equality that is essential to human dignity. 100 
39, at 36--42; Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A 
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S LT. 81, 87 
(1987); see Andrews v. Law Soc'y of British Columbia, [1989]1 S.C.R. 143, 167--68 
[1989] (Can.) (Mclntyre, J., dissenting), available at http://scc.lexum.org/en/1989/ 
1989scrl-143/1989scrl-143.pdf. 
98. Miller, supra note 34, at 47--48 (opinion of Dorner, J.). Justice Dorner accepted that 
the principle of equality is not entrenched as part of the Basic Law and thus cannot 
serve as the basis for judicial review of discriminatory practices. Id. at 43--44. But 
the Basic Law does, according to Dorner, protect against affronts to human dignity, 
and sex discrimination is such an affront. Jd. at 44--45. Others have rooted equal 
protection in the concept of human dignity. See Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated 
Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 426 
(1992); Alan Gewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in 1HE CONSTITUTION OF 
RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 10, 12 (Michael J. Meyer & 
William A. Parent eds., 1992); Neomi Rao, Gender, Race, and Individual Dignity: 
Evaluating Justice Ginsburg's Equality Jurisprudence, 70 OHIO ST. L.l 1053, 1059, 
1080 (2009) (discussing Justice Ginsburg's focus on dignity in her equal protection 
jurisprudence); Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion 
Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1745-52 (2008) (arguing that 
the undue burden framework for evaluating abortion regulations seeks to vindicate 
both the equality and liberty dimensions of human dignity). 
99. See Caroline Forell, Gender Equality, Social Values and Provocations in the United 
States, Canada and Australia, 14 AM. U. l GENDER SOC. POL'y & L. 27, 40--42 
(2006) (discussing how Canada's treatment of gender discrimination as a matter of 
human dignity leads to a broader equality than does the equal protection analysis used 
in the United States and Australia). 
100. See Andrews v. Law Soc'y of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 164 (Can.) 
(Mclntyre, l, dissenting) ("It must be recognized at once, however, that every 
difference in treatment between individuals under the law will not necessarily result in 
inequality and, as well, that identical treatment may frequently produce serious 
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Thus, laws that give benefits to women would not necessarily 
discriminate against women if the purpose of the discrimination were 
to protect or promote human dignity, autonomy, or substantive 
equality. 
Recognizing that such an affront on human dignity must be 
balanced against competing governmental interests, Justice Dorner 
equated the differences encountered in Miller to biological 
differences like pregnancy and differences in religious beliefs and 
demanded that the military step up to "adapt[] to the needs of 
women."IOI But are legally created differences the same as biological 
differences or differences in religious beliefs? Justice Dorner argued 
that any discrimination must be uprooted regardless of its cause. 102 
Still, does the army need to accommodate handicapped soldiers in 
combat units? Or more pertinently, would the army need to 
accommodate a woman if the underlying law said she could only 
serve for two years and could not commit to further service 
regardless of marital status (perhaps to encourage such a status)? 
Would the military have to accommodate such a legally created 
difference? 
Justice Dorner responded to this concern at the end of her opinion 
by appealing to the concept of proportionality: "In these 
circumstances, where an extra financial burden is imposed on all 
private employers for the sake of achieving equality, considerations 
of budgeting and planning efficiency cannot justify a decision of the 
State that violates a basic right." 103 But does "budgeting and planning 
efficiency" in the context of the military go to interests in national 
security? Having enough pilots to fight in wars seems more than 
mere administrative efficiency and planning. Can no amount of 
planning and efficiency overcome the need to accommodate women? 
To answer these questions, Dorner leaned once again on the concept 
of human dignity, but a clear reconciliation of these concerns was 
missing: "[T]he damage caused by closing the aviation course to 
women exceeds the benefit of the planning considerations. First, 
closing the aviation course to women violates their dignity and 
degrades them." 
Although they both recognized the tension, both Justices Dorner's 
and Justice Strasberg-Cohen's opinions leave us to contemplate the 
inequality."), available at http://scc.lexum.org/en/1989/1989scrl-143/1989scrl-143. 
html; Forell, supra note 99, at 40-42. 
101. Miller, supra note 34, at 57 (opinion of Dorner, 1.). 
102. See id. at 57-58. 
103. Jd. at 60. 
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extent to which the military must accommodate legally created 
differences. As Justice Strasberg-Cohen remarked, a discriminatory 
law such as the Defense Service Law should be amended or 
neutralized in order to achieve equality, "although not at any 
price.,,104 Justice Strasberg-Cohen contended that although the 
Defense Service Law creates a difference, and a weighty one as she 
explicitly acknowledged, it can be neutralized at a "reasonable price" 
and therefore must be. 105 But what is a reasonable price to impose on 
the Israeli Air Force, and how can it be determined in the context of a 
country that is in a state of continuous military struggle internally and 
with its neighbors? 
Justice Mazza was the only justice who realistically struggled with 
this tension, which I believe is the key to this seminal case. He took 
seriously the planning, efficiency, and budgetary concerns potentially 
imposed upon the military by the Israel Defense Service Law: 
Even a temporary absence of a woman pilot during her 
compulsory service, as a result of pregnancy or childbirth, 
can disrupt the planned daily activity of the whole airborne 
unit. And perhaps the main difficulty lies in the inability to 
rely on her undertaking to continue reserve duty for which 
she is not liable, since, if she becomes pregnant or gives 
birth, and gives notice that she retracts her commitment to 
volunteer, there will be no legal possibility of compelling 
her to serve. 106 
Recognizing the potential breadth and impact of these benefits is 
important because they are significant. Minimizing them and 
insisting that the army accommodate them at all costs fails to contend 
with their seriousness. 
Justice Mazza took a practical stance toward these concerns. He 
noted that these potential problems were based on the assumption that 
women would back out of their commitments, but he thought such 
assumptions were unfair: "As a rule, it is correct to assume that 
someone who commits himself to such an undertaking will want and 
be able to perform it. ,,107 He argued that, in other countries, 
disturbances from pregnancy and childbirth have been limited and 
104. Id. at 27-28 (opinion of Strasberg-Cohen, 1.). 
105. Id. at 28-29 ("Our case falls into the second category. in which the relevant 
differences can be neutralized and it ought to be remedied."). 
106. Jd. at 20 (opinion of Mazza, J.). 
107. Jd. 
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that men also occasionally back out of their commitments to 
continued service. 108 Other countries, however, do not exempt 
mothers from continued duty if they voluntarily commit to do SO.109 
Acknowledging this, Mazza proposed an experimental integration of 
women into the Israeli Air Force in order to determine the real extent 
of the burden on the military, which Mazza pointed out was only 
speculative and unsubstantiated by the military.llo Mazza suspected 
that there would be little extra burden, if any, that the vast majority of 
women pilots would uphold their voluntary commitments, and that 
minimal maternity leaves would not greatly disrupt military 
function. III 
In the end, Justice Mazza was likely right, and statistics have 
borne him out in Israel and internationally.ll2 And his decision and 
reasoning were sufficient to get past the weight of the legally created 
difference in this case. But the dilemma of legally created 
differences lives on and may not be so neatly parsed in the future. 
The problem is that although Israeli women are permitted into any 
military role, their benefits make them a liability and substantial 
integration has still not occurred. 
II. FINDING A FORMULA THAT CAN WORK FOR 
INCLUDING WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 
The way forward is not in contending with the weight of the 
difference created by the discriminatory Israeli Defense Service Law 
108. Jd. at 21; see also Leszkay, supra note 6, at 159, 162 (noting U.S. studies that 
maternity leaves for women and absences from reserves are comparable to leaves for 
men who go AWOL or are imprisoned for civilian violence-therefore, women and 
men have very similar attendance rates for military duty). 
109. See Women in the Military, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newworld 
encyclopedia.orgientry/Women jn _the_military (last visited Dec. 31, 2011) 
(explaining that females in Finland voluntarily undertake military service and that 
during the first forty-five days of service they have the option to leave the military 
without consequences, but after that, they are obligated to complete the service which 
lasts six, nine, or twelve months). 
110. Miller, supra note 34, at 21-23 (opinion of Mazza, 1.). 
111. Jd. at 20-22. 
112. See, e.g., Leszkay, supra note 6, at 159, 162; Rimalt, supra note 26, at 1105-06 
(describing logistical changes in a number of units and successes that women have 
achieved in combat units in the Israeli army); Mady W. Segal, The Argument for 
Female Combatants, in FEMALE SOLDIERS-COMBATANTS OR NON-COMBATANTS?: 
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 267, 272 (Nancy Loring Goldman 
ed., 1982). 
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but in reconsidering and unpacking the underlying law itself. 113 By 
giving benefits and exemptions to mothers, wives, and women 
generally, the Israeli Defense Service Law imposes an injustice on 
women. 
Sometimes a benefit can be a form of discrimination as well. 
Other times, benefits or accommodations are needed to support 
equality. When biological and value-producing gender differences 
are at stake, a concept of substantive equality that recognizes 
differences is needed to promote equality for women, support 
important societal values such as caregiving to children, and 
recognize differences in women's bodies and sexuality. I 14 Only when 
such secondary values are at stake should gender differences be 
recognized.ll5 Other times, recognizing differences can serve to 
subordinate women and lead to discrimination because such 
differences were created in a patriarchal society in which women 
113. Because the Defense Service Law dates back to the creation ofTsrael, it is entrenched 
and not subject to judicial review, making the law extremely difficult to overturn. See 
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992,1391 LSI 150, § 10 (1992) (Isr.), 
available at http://www.mfa.gov.iIlMF AlMF AArchive/1990 _1999/1992/3/Basic%20 
Law-%20Human%20Dignity%20and%20Liberty- (regarding the preservation of laws 
passed prior to adoption of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty). 
114. See Andrews v. Law Soc'y of British Columbia, [1989], I S.C.R 143,167-68 (Can.), 
available at http://scc.lexum.org/en/l989/1989scrl-143/l989scrl-143.html; MARTHA 
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL F AMIL Y AND OTHER 
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 235 (1995); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE 
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 212-24 (1990) 
(advocating a relational, contextual approach to considering difference); Finley, supra 
note 96, at 1150 ("Equality analysis simply cannot provide the answer. Only basic 
political and moral judgments about ultimate social aims can suggest a basis for 
choosing among possible similarities and dissimilarities. Even when the discourse 
moves to this value-laden level, it is not possible to guarantee completely satisfactory 
solutions free of perverse effects that can undermine whatever ultimate goal is at 
stake. These perverse effects are intrinsic to being both the same and different 
simultaneously, because as women choose to focus on certain similarities that we 
think will reduce gender hierarchy, the nagging differences will not disappear from 
view."); Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 
YALE LT. 913, 960-61 (promoting a more explicitly normative and moral approach to 
determining sex equality in constitutional law); Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 39, at 31-
52 (discussing different categories of gender differences and proposing an analysis for 
when gender differences should be recognized and supported and when ignored in 
order to support woman's equality in a substantive manner). 
115. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 39, at 36-39 ("Similarly, other than recognizing purely 
biological differences, recognition of difference should be justified in pursuit of a 
secondary objective beyond just promoting women's interests, where the difference is 
inextricably tied up with woman-hood."). 
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were subordinate. 116 What women need, as MacKinnon has 
explained, is to "have it both ways"-sometimes to be treated the 
same, and sometimes to be treated differently, depending on the 
nature of the difference that is at stake. I 17 The goal is to be able to 
decipher between instances when benefits cause harm and reinforce 
inequality, and instances when benefits or accommodations promote 
justice and are necessary to achieve equality. In order to distinguish 
between these circumstances, the rationale behind the laws that create 
the benefits must be examined to determine what is at stake and 
whether it is a benefit that truly serves a valid and valuable purpose 
or whether it is merely discrimination. 
It is not a coincidence that, in both the United States and Israel, 
there are legally created differences between the sexes in military 
contexts, as seen in the Israeli Defense Service Law and in U.S. draft 
laws. First, the courts give a tremendous amount of discretion to the 
military's internal decisions in light of the purpose of protecting the 
nation. I 18 Second, there is heavy entrenchment of the military as a 
male-dominant institution. I 19 
The justification for the Israeli Defense Service Law may be based 
on a policy that women, once they are wives or mothers, are not 
suited for military service. This is a blatantly discriminatory policy, 
particularly in a militarized society such as Israel, in which the vast 
majority of societal leaders have held high command. 120 The military 
116. See MACKINNON, supra note 94, at 32-33. 39 nD]emands for equality will always 
appear to be asking to have it both ways: the same when we are the same. different 
when we are different. But this is the way men have it: equal and different too. They 
have it the same as women when they are the same and want it. and different from 
women when they are different and want to be. which usually they do. Equal and 
different too would only be parity."); Laufer-Ukeles. supra note 39. at 36-39. 
117. MACKINNON, supra note 94. at 39. 
118. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. 
119. See infra notes 148-56 and accompanying text. 
120. See HALPERIN-KADDARI. supra note 28. at 155; lzraeli. supra note 27. at 142; Rimalt. 
supra note 26. at 1104. Service in high-status positions in the army is credited for 
generating social and political status as well as material advantages. 
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is clearly central to Israeli society,121 so to deem women less capable 
and unnecessary for military purposes is deeply problematic. 122 
In fact, however, the policy behind the sex-based classification in 
the law is more complex. The rationale behind the legal 
differentiation between men and women is not explicitly 
discriminatory but a matter of a national agenda-reproduction. 123 
Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion explained that the benefits that 
were bestowed are in praise of "the woman's special mission, the 
mission of motherhood.,,124 National and religiously driven attempts 
to repopulate a horribly diminished Jewish population post-Holocaust 
are still felt in Israel. I25 Moreover, tense demographic pressures 
against maintaining a Jewish majority in the state of Israel compound 
the push towards procreation. 126 Such an agenda has influenced a 
plethora of legislation and national policy that is pro-matemalist and 
pro-reproduction.127 Indeed women's roles in reproduction have been 
compared with and seen as complementary to the male role in the 
military. 128 
121. Y AGIL LEVY, ISRAEL'S MATERIALIST MILITARISM 23-27 (2007) (referring to the Israeli 
military as the melting pot of society); Hadar Aviram, Discourse of Disobedience: 
Law, Political Philosophy, and Trials of Conscientious Objectors, 9 1.L. SOC'Y I, 11-
12 (2008); see Baruch Kimmerling, Patterns of Militarism in Israel, 34 EUR. J. Soc. 
196, 207 (1993); Rimalt, supra note 26, at 1103 ("In Israel, military service is 
recognized as a hallmark of citizenship."). 
122. See Rimalt, supra note 26, at 1104 (describing how the subordinate role of women in 
the Israeli military leads to less than equal citizenship in society). 
123. But see Barak-Erez, supra note 19, at 535 (discussing CA 5/51 Steinberg v. Attorney 
Gen., [1951] 5 PD 1061 (Isr.) where the court stated, "When imposing a duty of 
service on women, the Israeli legislature expanded the enlistment structure accepted 
worldwide. At the same time, however, since women cannot serve in all military 
duties, as well as willing to show respect for the opinions of part of the population, it 
did not impose on women military duties equal to those of men."). 
124. Id. at 536-37 (discussing Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's statements during the 
debates on the Defense Service Law of 1949, Session 68 of the First Knesset); see 
also Noya Rimalt, Equality with a Vengeance: Female Conscientious Objectors in 
Pursuit of a Voice and Substantive Gender Equality, 16 COLUM. 1. GENDER & L. 97, 
106-08 (2007). 
125. See, e.g., Nitza Berkovitch, Motherhood as a National Mission: The Construction of 
Womanhood in the Legal Discourse in Israel, 20 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 605, 610 
(1997). 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 605-16. 
128. On the coupling of obligations for reserve duty and maternity leave, see HC1 335/76 
Lifschitz-Aviram v. Israel Lawyers Assoc. [1977] 31(1) PD 250 (Isr.); Omi 
Morgenstern-Leissner, Hospital Birth, Military Service and the Ties that Bind Them: 
The Case of Israel, 12 NASHIM: J. JEWISH WOMEN'S STUD. & GENDER ISSUES 203 
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The agenda is arguably understandable and certainly valid if a 
country so espouses it. Certainly, it is as valid as China's agenda of 
limiting family size for the sake of reducing its population. 129 
Moreover, one might argue that given that the vast majority of 
countries in the world exempt women from the mandatory draft 
altogether, Israel is actually relatively progressive in its stance toward 
women as soldiers. 13o 
Yet there is no acceptable justification for demanding that the 
agenda of reproducing Jews be borne only by the country's women, 
despite their individual preferences, talents, careers, and agendas. 
While women alone can gestate, both men and women are capable of 
providing the time and energy needed to care for children, which is 
the basis for the benefits and exclusions in the law beyond basic 
maternity leave. Proponents of the law will counter that, in fact, 
women will bear much of this burden, and it is their right to choose to 
do SO.131 It is indeed likely that given modern social norms, women 
will bear most of the burden of child-rearing, or experience most of 
the joys-depending on your perspective-and it is not only their 
right but perhaps to their benefit to do so. Still, it is deeply 
problematic for the law to codify this reality in a coercive manner by 
giving women the "benefit" of exemptions and shortened service 
requirements so that they can care for children without allowing men 
to choose to be the primary caregivers and women to choose to be the 
primary soldiers and serve regularly in reserve duty. 132 By coercively 
providing the benefit only to women, the army can justify sex-based 
policies that ban women from many military roles that require a long 
training period and may have extended reserve duty.133 These roles 
(2006); Frances Raday, Equality, Religion, and Gender in Israel, JEWISH WOMEN'S 
ARCHIVE. http:/ ~i wa. org/ encyclopedia! article/ equality -religion -and-gender-in-israel, 
(last visited Dec. 31, 2011). For a U.S. example of such coupling, see Littleton, supra 
note 39, at 1330-31. 
129. See Matthew D. Martin III, The Dysfunctional Progeny of Eugenics: Autonomy Gone 
AWOL, 15 CARDOZO J. TNT'L & COMPo L. 371, 398-417 (2007); Amartya Sen, Fertility 
and Coercion, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1035, 1054-58 (1996) (providing an overview and 
philosophical discussion of the one-child policy implemented in China to curb 
population growth); Nicole Skalla, China's One-Child Policy: Illegal Children and 
the Family Planning Law, 30 BROOK. J. TNT'L L. 329 (2004). 
130. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. 
131. See Leora F. Eisenstadt, Privileged but Equal? A Comparison of the us. and Israeli 
Notions of Sex Equality in Employment Law, 40 V AND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 357, 377-79 
(2007). 
132. See Barak-Erez, supra note 19, at 537-38. 
133. See id. at 538--40. 
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are typically quite prestigious and give soldiers professional training 
and connections that carryover into civilian life after service. 134 
Instead, while maintaining the value and purpose of supporting 
reproduction, the Israeli legislature should allow either parent to 
choose to be exempted from reserve duty upon the birth of a child. 
Similarly, compulsory duty should be shortened for either a mother 
or a father upon pregnancy or either mother or father in single sex-
couples. Maternity leave for women must be given, but there is no 
sex-based reason for women but not men to care for young children. 
Even if it is the case that usually it is women who choose to do so, 
not providing an option to deny such benefits is the cause of the 
Miller dilemma. The Israeli Defense Service Law stereotypes 
women and bases legislation on such stereotypes. It does not allow 
for some women to opt out and for men to step up to the caregiver 
role. 135 In so doing, the Israeli legal system stereotypically assumes 
that motherhood and primary child rearing is the province of women. 
In that regard, the Israeli law is more problematic and harmful to 
women than the U.S. laws and regulations that exclude women 
entirely from compulsory draft registration and from direct combat 
units. 136 This is because nothing in the U.S. law benefits women so 
extensively that they cannot opt out of their special treatment. 
Women may not be drafted in the United States, but they can commit 
themselves to voluntary service. 137 Once they do so, they are 
permitted maternity leave, but they have the same requirements as 
men to serve in reserve duty.138 Women cannot serve in direct-
combat units, but they serve in many non-direct units 139 and, upon 
giving birth, they can take six weeks maternity leave and defer 
deployment for up to four months.140 Moreover, the realities of 
modern warfare for U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan are that 
women who are connected to combat units are essentially on the front 
lines because traditional wars with front lines have been replaced by 
broad attacks on military postS.141 "[Military experts indicate] that 
134. See Guy 1. Seidman & Eyal A. Nun, Women, the Military and the Court: Israel at 
2001,11 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 91, 99-100 (2001). 
135. Defense Service Law, 5746-1986, 40 LSI 112, § 39 (amended in 2000) (Tsr.). 
136. See 50 U.S.c. app. § 453(a) (2006); DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 16, at 3. 
137. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 453(a); DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 17, at 3, 12. 
138. See DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 17, at 6. See generally 10 U.S.C. § 12103 (2006); 6 
C.J.S. Armed Services § 50 (2011). 
139. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 17, at 3. 
140. Jd. at 6. 
141. See Harding, supra note 10. 
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technology and circumstance have drastically altered modem 
warfare." They say it is difficult to distinguish between combat and 
non-combat roles on the front lines of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan." 142 Thus, despite legislative classifications excluding 
women from combat, U.S. women soldiers fare better because they 
are burdened by fewer benefits and stereotypical mandates. Women 
who want to be leaders in the U.S. military at least have the right to 
opt out of the roles to which they are pegged. 
In sum, benefits, exemptions, and accommodations need to be 
examined in context. In Israel, women have the right to enter all 
areas of the military. 143 But based on the entrenched gender 
separation regarding the role of women in motherhood and 
reproduction, they do not have the ability to escape the negative 
consequences of the benefits that are granted to them. 144 The Israeli 
Defense Service Law is deeply gendered in its provisions, and simply 
opening access to women will not cure this gendered legislation. 145 
Benefits and accommodations to women that rely on stereotypes and 
cultural differences, such as women's propensity to care for children, 
must be gender-neutral in order to give both men and women 
freedom to choose these roles. 146 Cultural gender differences, such as 
women's identification with the caregiver role, cannot be made sex-
specific without being discriminatory.147 The value of care giving that 
justifies the benefits provided to women is valid, but placing such 
cultural gender roles upon women only entrenches and fixes gender 
roles in an unjustifiable manner. 
142. Jd. 
143. Women's Equal Rights Law, 5711-1951. 5 LSI 171. § 6D (amended in 2000) (Isr.). 
144. See supra notes 123-34 and accompanying text. 
145. See Barak-Erez. supra note 19. at 545; supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. 
146. CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON. On Exceptionality: Women as Women in Law. in 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 70. 73 (1987) ("A few 
husbands are like most wives-tinancially dependent on their spouse. It is also true 
that a few fathers. like most mothers are primary parents. . .. My point, though, is 
that occupying those particular positions is consistent with the norms for gender 
female. To be poor. financially dependent. and a primary parent constitutes part of 
what being a woman means. Most of those who are in those circumstances are 
women. A gender-neutral approach to those circumstances obscures. while the 
protectionist approach declines to change. the fact that women's poverty. financial 
dependency, motherhood and sexual accessibility (our targeted-for-sexual-violation 
status) substantively make up women's status as women. It describes what it is to be 
most women. That some men find themselves in a similar situation doesn't mean that 
they occupy that status as men, as members of their gender. They do so as exceptions, 
both in norms and numbers." (footnote omitted)). 
147. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 39. at 36--47. 
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III. THE POWER OF CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS NORMS 
DESPITE FORMAL EQUALITY 
Despite the Miller case and the repeal of sex-based classifications 
regarding placement of women in military professions, the Israeli 
military is very much a male-dominated institution with significant 
separation of the sexes. 148 As a matter of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 
policy, even though legally permitted,149 women still do not serve as 
front-line infantry or artillery combat. 1so Only a marginal number of 
women have entered the ranks of certain specialty combat roles-
pilots, navigators, anti-aircraft soldiers, field intelligence, unmanned 
aerial vehicle operators, and, very recently, naval officers. 151 The 
army is still largely segregated by sex, with most women serving in 
dedicated roles as educators, instructors, engineers, logistics 
personnel, office personnel, and guides. 152 They are largely 
facilitators, not combatants. This is so despite the fact that modem 
military roles require much less physical strength and much more 
intellectual and mechanical prowess. 153 
The significant benefits given to Israeli women by the Defense 
Service Law only serve to frustrate the integration of women by 
making them risky and unpalatable soldiers on paper and by 
differentiating them even more from their male peers. 154 In the end, 
the Israeli military is segregated because it always has been, because 
that is the culture of the military, and because sex segregation and 
discrimination is still a reality in Israeli society. 155 Gender-neutral 
laws cannot change the reality of social norms, particularly when 
there is limited judicial review in Israel and significant benefits that 
148. See Rimalt, supra note 26, at 1104, 1107-19; Robbins & Ben Eliezer, supra note 27, 
passim; Orna Sasson-Levy, Feminism and Military Gender Practices: Israeli Women 
Soldiers in Masculine Roles, 73 Soc. INQUIRY 440, 444-46 (2003). 
149. Defense Service Law, 5746-1986, 40 LSI 112, § 16A (amended in 2000) (Isr.); 
Women's Equal Rights Law, 5711-1951, 5 LSI 171, § 6D (amended in 2000) (Isr.); 
Barak-Erez, supra note 19, at 544 ('" [E]very woman who is eligible for service in the 
defense forces, or who serves in them, has a right equal to that of a man to serve in 
any duty, or to be assigned to any duty. '" (quoting § 6D of the Women's Equal Rights 
Law)). 
150. See Rimalt, supra note 26, at 1113; Robbins & Ben-Eliezer, supra note 27, at 330-34. 
151. See Rimalt, supra note 26, at 1113 ("[I]n 2005, only 2.5% of women soldiers served 
in combat roles."). 
152. See id. at 1113-14; Sasson-Levy, supra note 148, at 445. 
153. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 
154. See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text. 
155. See infra notes 157-88 and accompanying text; Rimalt, supra note 26, at 1100-04. 
2012] Cross-Dressers with Benefits 347 
frustrate the goal of equality. 156 Gender-neutrality provides the 
opportunity for change, but it will not be realized without more 
fundamental changes in society and in the structure and orientation of 
the military and the legislation that forms the military. 
Segregation and discrimination are also the influence of religious 
Jewish norms in Israel. 157 Such religious norms affect society, the 
law, and the military. 158 In fact, during discussions about the Defense 
Service Law, religious members of the Knesset were vocally opposed 
to women serving in any military capacity. 159 Although they failed to 
universally exclude women from military service, they were able to 
reach a compromise with secular members to allow women, but not 
men, to exempt themselves from mandatory conscription for reasons 
of "conscience," including religious reasons. 160 As originally drafted, 
156. See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, 1391 LSI 150, § 10 (1992) 
(Isr.) (indicating that there is no judicial review of older laws). See generally Daphne 
Barak-Erez, From an Unwritten to a Written Constitution: The Israeli Challenge in 
American Perspective, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 309, 326-31 (1995) (discussing 
the availability of judicial review under the Basic Laws). In order to give the 
legislature time to work out problems with enacted laws. newer laws can be exempted 
from being subject to judicial review for being discriminatory or otherwise violating 
the Basic Laws for a limited period of time. See HCJ 2458/01 New Family Org. v. 
Surrogacy Agreements Approvals Comm. 57( I) PD 419 [2003] (Isr). For the 
interpretation of the basic laws as recognizing the possibility of judicial review. see 
CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. ViiI. 49(4) PD 221 [1995] 
(Isr.); for an English translation. see http://elyonl.court.gov.illfiles_eng/93/21O/068/ 
z01l9306821O.z01.pdf. See also Daphne Barak-Erez. Israel: The Security Barrier-
Between International Law, Constitutional Law, and Domestic Judicial Review, 4 
INT'L J. CaNST. L. 540, 542 (2006); Daphne Barak-Erez, Law and Religion Under the 
Status Quo Model: Between Past Compromises and Constant Change. 30 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2495. 2503 & n.28 (2009) ("Indeed, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty 
limits this possibility [of judicial review] only to new legislation, introduced after 
1992. However. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation is applicable to former laws."). 
157. See Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Women, Religion and Multiculturalism in Israel. 5 UCLA 
J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 339. 344-47 (2000) (acknowledging religion as a primary 
factor in disadvantaging women). 
158. Compare id. at 352-59.361-64 (discussing how religious norms have shaped laws. 
qualifications to be rabbinical advocates. and the membership of legislative bodies). 
and Ran HirschI, Constitutional Rights vs. Religious Fundamentalism: Three Middle 
Eastern Tales, 82 TEx. L. REv. 1819, 1842-44 (2004) (outlining several contexts in 
which religious norms would exclude women from leadership positions and conflict 
with Israeli secular norms of equality), with Rimalt. supra note 124, at 105--06 
(discussing how religious norms have shaped the military). 
159. Rimalt. supra note 124, at 108 (citing remarks from the 1949 debate in the Israeli 
Parliament regarding the Defense Service Law). 
160. Id. at 108-09; see Defense Service Law, 5746-1986,40 LSI 112, § 39 (amended in 
2000) (Isr.) (,The following persons shall be exempt from the duty of the defense 
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the exemption was only available for religious reasons. 161 But some 
religious and secular members of Parliament (the Israeli Knesset) did 
not want to limit the conscientious objection to religious reasons 
because they held broad beliefs about the differences between men 
and women in the military as well as concerns about discriminating 
against secular women. 162 In the end, the decision as to who would 
get the benefit of women's exclusion from the draft for reasons of 
conscience was left to the individuals applying for such exemptions, 
and although the exclusion was usually used for religious reasons, the 
objection of conscience exclusion was applied more broadly. 163 
In Milo v. Ministry of Defense, this uneasy status quo came to an 
end as the Israeli Supreme Court more squarely addressed the issue 
of the exclusions from service available to women but not men under 
the Objections of Conscience Clause. 164 The Israeli Supreme Court 
decided that a woman did not have a right to a waiver from army 
service because of her conscientious objection to Israeli policies in 
the occupied territories. 165 Milo argued that she was entitled to opt 
out of military service because section 39(c) of the Defense Service 
Law permits women (but not men) to opt out of military service 
because of their conscientious objections or religious reasons. 166 The 
Israeli Supreme Court ultimately determined that only conscientious 
objections for religious reasons were covered by section 39(c) and 
service ... (c) A female person of military age who has proved, in such manner and to 
such authority as shall be prescribed by regulations, that reasons of conscience or 
reasons connected with her family's religious way of life prevent her from serving in 
defense service shall be exempt from that duty of service."). 
161. Rimalt, supra note 124, at 108. 
162. See id. at 110-11. 
163. See id. at 108-15. 
164. HeJ 2383/04 Milo v. Minister of Def 59(1) PD 166 [2004] (Tsr.) (translated by 
author). 
165. Id. 
166. Defense Service Law, 5746-1986, 40 LSI 112, § 39(c) (amended in 2000) (Isr.). The 
Defense Service Law also allows a man or women to be excused from service for 
various reasons only upon express permission by order ofthe Minister of Defense. Jd. 
§ 36 (,The Minister of Defense may, by order, if he sees fit to do so for reasons 
connected with the size of the regular forces or reserve forces of the Israel Defense 
Forces or for reasons connected with the requirements of education, security, 
settlement or the national economy or for family reasons or other reasons (1) exempt a 
person of military age from the duty of regular service or reduce the period of his 
service; (2) exempt a person of military age from the duty of reserve service for a 
specified period or absolutely .... "). 
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that all other female objectors should be treated just like men under 
section 36. 167 
The benefit Milo sought under the Defense Service Law was 
based on no reason other than cultural norms, stereotypes, and 
protectionist sentiments towards women. 168 Milo did not even 
attempt to bring a broader rationale; she simply argued that, based on 
what the law said, she was entitled to an exemption from service. 169 
Some feminists have argued that the conscientious exemption for 
women advanced substantive equality by mainstreaming an 
alternative path of citizenship that was more feminine, less 
militaristic, and not dominated by the male establishment. 17o In 
particular, Noya Rimalt points to national service as a valid feminine 
alternative to military service that was paving a new and feminized 
path to citizenship.171 Rimalt complains that marginal desegregation 
does not begin to break down the male dominated nature of the 
military, and, thus, an alternative is needed.172 It is worth noting, 
however, that those women who were exempted from military service 
were not obligated to perform alternative national service-they 
chose to.173 And it was mostly religiously observant women who 
chose this alternative path.174 
There is no doubt that allowing women exemptions from military 
service not available to men provides a benefit that violates formal 
167. HC] 2383/04 Milo v. Minister of Def. 59(1) PD 166 [2004] (lsr.) (translated by 
author). This provision should not be confused with exemptions received by Haredi 
men engaged in full-time study at religious institutions. Such exemptions are not 
available to women. See Yehuda Goodman, Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion: 
Comparing Mental Illness Narratives of Haredi Male Patients and Their Rabbis, 25 
CULTURE MED. & PSYCHIATRY 169, 177 (2001). 
168. See Rimalt, supra note 124, at 105-12. 
169. Id. at 140. 
170. See id. at 115-21; see also MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 273 (discussing the 
following arguments in favor of exempting women from registering for the draft: (I) 
women are less competent at military tasks, particularly combat tasks; (2) the draft 
would disrupt family plans; (3) stereotypical male protectionism of women may 
adversely affect military success; (4) captured and imprisoned women would suffer 
more brutality at the hands of the enemy; and (5) women, with their feminist nature, 
would have difficulty fitting into male militaristic culture) cf Littleton, supra note 39, 
at 1329-32 (discussing how motherhood could be compared to military service in 
terms of providing valuable service to one's country). 
171. See Rimalt, supra note 124, at 115-21. 
172. Id. at 117-19. 
173. Id. at 119. 
174. Id. at 119-20. 
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equality. 175 If an exemption for conscientious objections were given 
to both men and women who were disinclined to serve, it might 
promote an alternative means of achieving valid citizenship. 
However, for Israel's national security, such an exemption is not 
possible at this time.176 As a result, the exemption is available only 
for women. 177 
Exempting women more broadly than men from military service 
because women are less powerful and suffer more discrimination in 
the military, as Rimalt suggests, will not promote substantive equality 
in the long run.178 First, women will not integrate in the military and 
in society more broadly if they do not serve as often as possible. 179 
As army service is so central to Israeli society, maximal integration is 
needed to support women's equal citizenship.180 Second, reinforcing 
women's second-class status by legislation that permits them to be 
exempted-in a manner not dissimilar to U.S. draft exclusions-
gives legal force to discriminatory practices against women. 181 In 
addition, excluding women from mandatory service silences 
women's voices as conscientious objectors because their objection to 
military service would not matter. 182 The ultimate goal must be to 
integrate women fully into military life or provide conscientious 
objector exclusions for both men and women who may have 
problems serving. This would require a national service alternative 
for both men and women when security considerations and military 
staffing needs allow such an alternative to be implemented. Equality 
will not result from permitting gender differentiation because of 
cultural stereotypes that pervade military service; such a practice will 
serve to legitimize such discrimination. 
As a result of the ruling in Milo, military service is not mandatory 
for religious women, but it is for secular women. 183 Such religious 
benefits for women have a number of problematic effects. First, 
175. HeJ 2383/04 Milo v. Minister of Def 59(1) PD 166 [2004] (Isr.) (translated by 
author). 
176. See Rimalt, supra note 124, at III (quoting DK (1978) 2380 (statement of Amnon 
Rubinstein)). 
177. Defense Service Law, 5746-1986, 40 LSI 112, § 39(c) (amended in 2000) (Isr.). 
178. Rimalt, supra note 124, at 142-44. 
179. See Rimalt, supra note 26, at 1113-15. 
180. Id. at 1104. 
181. Rimalt, supra note 124, at 142. 
182. See id. at 142-43 (acknowledging this problem with allowing female exemptions but 
discussing the benetits of such exemptions); see also Becker, supra note 12, at 496-
500. 
183. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
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segregation based on Jewish norms makes it harder for Israeli women 
to achieve equality within and outside of the military.184 Because 
religious women frequently opt out of service, there are fewer women 
in the military, undermining integration. 18s Moreover, the state 
allowing such segregation affects the perception of women more 
generally.186 The military normalizes sex discrimination by acceding 
to religious demands. 187 In addition to allowing only religious 
women to be exempted from army service, religious soldiers seek 
modesty and protection of "family purity" by demanding that co-ed 
units be segregated by sex, and the military often accedes to these 
demands. 188 Second, the goal of religious tolerance co-opts the state 
in sex segregation only for the religious, which can create bad 
feelings between the religious and secular communities and tarnish 
the state's commitment to equality. Third, focusing on religious 
gender concerns allows the state to feel justified in its policies and 
ignore the deeper ways in which the state discriminates against 
women outside religious contexts-discrimination that could perhaps 
be equally as harmful. 
IV. CONCLUSION: PUTTING THE ANALYSIS INTO 
CONTEXT 
In contrast to the upbeat reports in the media and popular beliefs 
about their power and equal status, the reality for women in the 
184. See David ben Yacov, Report: Religious Men in Army Bad for Women, ISR. NAT'L 
NEWS (July 21, 2011, 3:24 PM), http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News. 
aspxl145950 (reporting that a special TDF report claims that the integration of 
religious soldiers in the TDF leads to discrimination against women); Amos Harel, 
JDF General Causes Storm After Calling to Curtail Religiosity in Army, 
HAARETZ.COM (July 20, 20 II, 3: II AM), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/ 
idf-general-causes-storm-after-calling-to-curtail-religiosity-in-army-I.3 74118 
(discussing how religious demands for modesty undermine integration of women in 
the military). 
185. See Yaakov Katz, JDF Wants More Female Enlistments, JERUSALEM POST (Mar. 8, 
2007, 1 :08 AM), http://www.jpost.com/Tsrael/ Article.aspx?id=53898. 
186. Rimalt, supra note 26, at 1104. 
187. See, e.g., Merav Michaeli, Full Integration of Women into IDF Would Be Goodfor 
Israel's Security, HAARETZ.COM (July 21, 2011,1:52 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/ 
print-edition/features/full-integration-of-women-into-idf-would-be-good-for-israel-s-
security-1.374356 (noting that some religious leaders put "great pressure to reduce or 
stop the process of absorbing women" on the army). 
188. See Yofi Tirosh, Alice Through the Looking Glass: Reflections on Representations of 
the Female Body in the Discourse on Integrating Women in Combat Roles, in 
DISCOURSE ON INTEGRATING WOMEN IN COMBAT ROLES, GENDER, LAW AND FEMINISM 
(2007) [Hebrew]. 
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Israeli military is more complicated. Despite women's access to 
combat roles, exceptions, benefits, cultural norms, and religious 
influence all create a complex dynamic regarding women's equality 
in Israel in general and in the military more specifically. Israel's 
commitment to formal equality is peppered with loopholes described 
as benefits. Israel's commitment to substantive equality, which 
allows for such benefits to be given only to women, is neither 
sufficiently rationalized nor based on legitimate, valuable differences 
in women that need to be promoted by such legislation and policies. 
Rather, such benefits camouflage protectionism, stereotypes, and 
discrimination. 
Indeed, it is ironic that in a rare instance in which the United 
States breaks with its strong judicial and legislative emphasis on 
formal equality to achieve effective equality for women, the United 
States proves to be progressive when compared to the more gender-
neutral Israeli military. 189 While ironic, it is not surprising. Although 
classifications can be discriminatory and harmful toward women's 
interests, the lack of gender-based classifications does not ensure 
equal access, stature, or even opportunity for women. 190 Moreover, 
not providing benefits to women when real differences are 
involved-not providing maternity leave-can seriously hamper 
women's advancement. The nature of benefits and classifications of 
all kinds must be carefully examined to reveal their underlying 
justifications, which then must be judged in light of the validity of the 
goals involved. Moreover, underlying cultural norms must be 
examined to identify the most realistic means of achieving equality in 
the relevant social climate. 
In the case of the Israeli Defense Service Law, there is no valid 
justification for differentiating between men and women when it 
comes to length of duty, participation in reserves, and the ability to 
opt out of military service for family reasons or conscientious 
objection. The Israeli legislative goal of supporting child rearing is 
valid, but there is no justification whatsoever to make this policy sex-
specific. Doing so not only coercively pushes mothers into domestic 
roles that otherwise may have been shared or split differently, it 
penalizes, in an unforgiving manner, women who want to serve but 
are not and may never be mothers. Thus, the policy stereotypes 
women as mothers and disadvantages those women who do not fit the 
stereotypes and those men who are or would like to be primary 
189. See supra notes 136-53 and accompanying text. 
190. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
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caregivers to their children. It also hampers women's integration into 
the military and society more generally as fewer women serve and do 
so for shorter periods of time. l9l Women don't need those kinds of 
benefits when they are taking on traditional male roles. Those kinds 
of benefits are dangerously double-edged and must be rooted out as 
voraciously as paternalistic legislation prohibiting women from 
combat roles, because the effect is precisely the same. 
The Israeli Defense Service Law should and can be made gender-
neutral while maintaining its carve outs for primary caregivers to 
further Israel's pronatalist agenda. l92 In so doing, Israel will support 
the laudable goals of protecting and valuing child rearing and 
reproduction without bootstrapping women by fiat. 
In the United States, classification on the basis of sex persists in 
the military, as women are excluded from combat roles. 193 Yet 
women are making waves nonetheless. 194 Social, cultural and legal 
advances in women's equality outside the military have filtered into 
the ranks of deployed forces. 195 Leaving women free to choose to 
volunteer as they see fit in the context of modern warfare, where the 
front lines blend with support roles, has enabled women's integration 
despite classificatory legislation. 196 The lack of particular benefits for 
women allows women to commit, in many situations, to act in 
operative combat roles in a manner indistinguishable from male 
service. 197 
A Pentagon commission on diversity has recently recommended 
that the U.S. military end its ban on women serving in direct combat 
roles for two reasons: (1) such a restriction is discriminatory, and (2) 
it is out of touch with modern warfare. 198 Neutralizing the law for 
combat roles makes a lot of sense in modern times and would be a 
huge triumph for women in the United States. Excluding women 
from combat and from the draft hurts women in a variety of 
191. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. 
192. See supra Part II. 
193. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
194. Darlene M. Iskra, Who are the Women Who Have Broken Through the Military's 
"Brass" Ceiling?, F. PUB. POL'y (Summer 200S), http://forumonpublicpolicy.com/ 
summerOSpapers/archivesummerOS/iskra.pdf 
195. See supra notes 137--42 and accompanying text. 
196. See Iskra, supra note 194, at S. 
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overlapping ways. 199 But it should be noted that simply allowing 
women into combat units will not create equality and that substantive 
oversight and careful consideration should be undertaken to be sure 
women and others are not discriminated against in practice-in the 
military and elsewhere. 
199. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 12, at 496-500 ("Exclusion of women from militia 
service in combat denies women the obligations of full citizenship."); Leszkay, supra 
note 6, passim. 
